‘Without Isi, The Mumbai Attack Would Not Have Been Possible’

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[color=#000000][font=Arial][size=3][b]HeadleySpeak[/b][/size][/font][/color][list]
[*]Maj Iqbal was my handler. He and Lt Col Hamza listened to my plan for more than two hours. The Lt Col assured me of all financial help.”
[*]Maj Iqbal paid me $25,000 (for the recce trip to Mumbai). He was already aware of the transportation of attackers to Mumbai through the sea route.
[*]Maj Iqbal asked me to explore the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in Mumbai, especially its staff colony, as a target...
[*]ISI was under pressure to stop the integration of Kashmir-based jehadi organisations with the Taliban-based outfits.
[*]The commitment to jehad in Afghanistan influenced many to leave Kashmir-centric outfits. This compelled the LeT to consider a spectacular terrorist strike in India.
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[color=#000000][font=Arial][size=3][i]The National Investigation Agency (NIA), India’s premier agency to investigate terrorist-related cases which was set up in December 2008, interrogated David Coleman Headley, one of the prime accused in the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, between June 3 and June 9, 2010. The three-member team comprising Inspector General Loknath Behra and superintendents of police Swayam Prakash Pani and Shajid Farid Shapoo managed to extract critical information from Headley. Following its own investigations, the NIA filed a chargesheet in a Delhi court on December 24, 2011. The chargesheet, which includes the interrogation report, and which has now been accessed by Outlook, categorically spells out the involvement of Pakistan and the ISI in the 26/11 strikes and will be handed over to the Judicial Commission of Pakistan on January 10. So what did Headley have to say to his Indian interrogators? Excerpts from his revelations:[/i][/size][/font][/color]
[color=#000000][font=Arial][size=3][img]http://photo.outlookindia.com/images/gallery/20100325/headley1_20100405.jpg[/img]

[b]On The ISI And LeT:[/b] After a couple of days of my arrival in Lahore (in early 2008), I got a call from Major Iqbal (of the ISI). I had never talked to Major Iqbal before. He gave the reference of Major Sameer Ali (also of the ISI) to me. He told me to come and meet him at a nearby location between the Lahore airport and the defence society. Major Iqbal introduced me to his boss, Lieutenant Colonel Hamza. He was a man in his early 40s. He was baby-faced and also overweight by army standards. From his accent, he appeared to be from Punjab. They listened to my entire (Mumbai attack) plan for more than two hours. Hamza assured me of financial help and directed me to follow the directions of Major Iqbal. That was the first and last meeting with Hamza. This was the only time I met him, because after that he was transferred from Lahore. Major Iqbal was my handler. To my knowledge, Abdur Rehman, a top LeT leader, was also contacted by the ISI handlers. I had met Major Sameer Ali on a couple of occasions. I was in contact with him through telephone and e-mails. In 2008, I once met one of the ISI handlers of Abdur Rehman Hashim, Colonel Shah. I believe that without the ISI, the Mumbai attack would not have been possible.[/size][/font][/color]
[color=#000000][font=Arial][size=3][b]The Funding:[/b] Upon my return from the US (in 2008), I met Major Iqbal in Lahore and Sajid (of the LeT) separately in Muzaffarabad. Iqbal paid me $25,000 in three bundles ($10,000, $10,000 and $5000). When I met Sajid, he was already aware that I had received the money. Upon my return from Muzaffarabad, I met Major Iqbal. He was already aware of the transportation of attackers to Mumbai through the sea route. He also suggested taking a large quantity of arms and ammunition and dumping them in India. According to Iqbal, the sea-route option happens only once in a while. So he believed full preparation for this trip should be made. Major Iqbal asked me to explore the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in Mumbai, especially its staff colony, as a target.... I had told my brother Hamza and uncle Saulat Rana about my visits to India.[/size][/font][/color]
[color=#000000][font=Arial][size=3][b]The Reason For The Strike:[/b] A debate had begun among the terrorist outfits as to whether to fight in Kashmir or in Afghanistan. The clash of ideology led to splits in many outfits. The decision of Abdur Rehman and Haroon (top LeT operatives) to split from LeT and fight in Afghanistan was part of this trend. Zaki (Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, chief military commander of LeT) had serious problems in holding the LeT and convincing them to fight for Kashmir and against India. With the Lal Masjid attack in 2007, something had to be done to keep the group involved in Kashmir.[/size][/font][/color]
[color=#000000][font=Arial][size=3]I understand that ISI was under tremendous pressure to stop any integration of Kashmir-based jehadi organisations with the Taliban-based outfits. It is always in the interest of the ISI to keep these two sets of outfits poles apart, so Zaki was only reiterating the ISI official line. However, the aggression and commitment to jehad shown by the several splinter groups in Afghanistan influenced many committed fighters to leave Kashmir-centric outfits. I understand this compelled the LeT to consider a spectacular terrorist strike in India.[/size][/font][/color]
[color=#000000][font=Arial][size=3]The ISI, I believe, had no ambiguity in understanding the necessity to strike India. It essentially would serve three purposes. First, it could stop further split in the Kashmir-based outfits. Second, it would provide them a sense of achievement, shifting and minimising the theatre of violence from the domestic soil of Pakistan to India. Also, after the Lal Masjid incident (which was stormed by the Pakistani army in 2007), something had to be done.[/size][/font][/color]
[color=#000000][font=Arial][size=3]Zaki would always justify jehad in Kashmir on the grounds that the ratio of deployment of force in Kashmir compared to the general population is very high. So it was legitimate to fight the occupation forces in Kashmir.... During this period, I realised that Captain Khurram (of the 6th Baloch and an LeT sympathiser) had died on March 30, 2007, in a drone attack. I remember the date as my son was also born on the same day. During this period, I met Zaki in Muzaffarabad. I had dinner with him. My country, Pakistan, was undergoing an identity crisis in the wake of the happenings in Afghanistan and the FATA areas of Pakistan. I understand this accelerated the Mumbai attack project. Earlier, it was a limited plan to attack only the hotel in Mumbai. But now it seemed to be a grand plan to strike Mumbai at multiple locations.[/size][/font][/color]
[color=#000000][font=Arial][size=3][b]Identifying The Landing Sites:[/b] I conducted four boat rides at different places. I took a boat ride from the Taj/Apollo Bunder area in the evening (April 9). Since it was getting dark, I could not see much. It was a tourist boat. On April 10, 2008, I took the second boat ride from Marine Drive. On April 11, I took the third boat ride. (Earlier) I went to the Cuffe Parade area, the place where the attackers finally landed. I had talked to a person who stays near a temple in that locality. He told me to come the next morning at 3 am for the boat ride. On April 12, I reached the place and took the boat. We went almost six kilometres from the seashore. I found this trip productive as this was the right place for the landing of the attackers.... I met Sajid after the attack (26/11) in Lahore. He was looking tired. I met him at my house. Sajid told me that the landing sites chosen by me had been used...[/size][/font][/color]

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