Remembering 26/11

[timmy]

 

[timmy]

 

[timmy]

 

[reality]

RIP... Salute to the brave hearts 🙏 ... may god bring peace to their family.

[Sachin200]

Really one of the sad day and it's Shame on Central government for the time it took for NSG commandos to reach Mumbai hotel 

[Sachin200]

Terrorists knew much more about the buildings under attack than the NSG

When the NSG reached Mumbai on November 27 morning, it did not have access to detailed layouts or maps of the buildings under attack. On the other hand, due to the recon done by Headley, the terrorists had this information. At the Taj, Oberoi and Nariman House, the NSG commandos fought with a major handicap.

10. NSG not given intercepted conversations

Though the Anti-Terror Squad of the Mumbai police recorded conversations between the terrorists and their handlers, these were not passed on quickly to the NSG. In addition, the terrorists’ plan to execute the hostages at Nariman House was not conveyed to the commandoes.

 

[Sachin200]

NSG, marine commandoes took very long to arrive

Though Mumbai had witnessed several terrorist acts before, there was no NSG centre close by. Commandoes had to be flown in from Manesar in Haryana. When NSG chief J.K. Dutt asked for a plane, he was told that the transport aircraft was in Chandigarh. Finally, R&AW intervened and provide an Ilyushin 76 parked at Palam airstrip to rush the commando unit to Mumbai.

However, this was a smaller aircraft and could only transport 120 troops. This meant that transporting the full team required three trips. Refuelling the aircraft and finding crew members also took away precious time, and the aircraft took off a good two hours after the request was made. The aircraft then took nearly three hours to reach Mumbai.

In order to counter the four terrorists in the Taj Mahal hotel, marine commandoes were summoned. But they too reached three hours after the attack began. As the local police was also not rushed in large numbers, they failed to contain the heavily armed attackers to a limited area.

8. Pakistani handlers benefited from media coverage

With TV news channels providing live coverage of the attacks, rescue operations were hampered. Pakistani handlers of the terrorists reportedly told them about the presence of dignitaries in the hotels as well as the impending security operations.

IThankst was on November 28 that the media was directed to only show “deferred” footage. Before there, no protocol had been put in place on how the emergency situation should be covered

[reality]

Just now, Sachin200 said:

Terrorists knew much more about the buildings under attack than the NSG

When the NSG reached Mumbai on November 27 morning, it did not have access to detailed layouts or maps of the buildings under attack. On the other hand, due to the recon done by Headley, the terrorists had this information. At the Taj, Oberoi and Nariman House, the NSG commandos fought with a major handicap.

10. NSG not given intercepted conversations

Though the Anti-Terror Squad of the Mumbai police recorded conversations between the terrorists and their handlers, these were not passed on quickly to the NSG. In addition, the terrorists’ plan to execute the hostages at Nariman House was not conveyed to the commandoes.

 

Biggest failure... that dumbo home minister Shivraj Patil.

[Sachin200]

Just now, reality said:

Biggest failure... that dumbo home minister Shivraj Patil.

Agree baa, it showed to the whole world how responsible can be our government 

[kidney]

RIP

[Kool_SRG]

I was in Mumbai when this happened...Salute to the police except for the effected rest of city was absolute calm and normal and offices functioning...

RIP to the brave hearts. Spirit of Mumbai 💪

[Kool_SRG]

24 minutes ago, Sachin200 said:

Really one of the sad day and it's Shame on Central government for the time it took for NSG commandos to reach Mumbai hotel 

It doesn't happen like that the central and state govt co-ordinate and ask for forces as per requirement...we can sit here and say things but never know whats happening there.

Mumbai City itself has plenty of forces in hand possibly they could have thought they could handle by themselves.

[reality]

Just now, Kool_SRG said:

It doesn't happen like that the central and state govt co-ordinate and ask for forces as per requirement...we can sit here and say things but never know whats happening there.

Mumbai City itself has plenty of forces in hand possibly they could have thought they could handle by themselves.

Bad intelligence/ proactive measures.

[Sachin200]

17 minutes ago, Kool_SRG said:

It doesn't happen like that the central and state govt co-ordinate and ask for forces as per requirement...we can sit here and say things but never know whats happening there.

Mumbai City itself has plenty of forces in hand possibly they could have thought they could handle by themselves.

Ak 47 teeskuni vastey local police ela handle chestaru bro , Mari darunam 

Daggarli commandos leru and that was the problem . 

[Sachin200]

18 minutes ago, Kool_SRG said:

It doesn't happen like that the central and state govt co-ordinate and ask for forces as per requirement...we can sit here and say things but never know whats happening there.

Mumbai City itself has plenty of forces in hand possibly they could have thought they could handle by themselves.

Akkada lenadhuku kadhu bro matter m attack avutunaye ante intime respond kale . 

 

Mumbai Police failed to engage the terrorists at the Taj Hotel

Apart from lack of arms, there were not enough policemen to keep the pressure up on terrorists. For three crucial hours after the attack, all the four terrorists were holed up in the upper floors of the Taj after killing over 20 persons in the lobby. The policemen who engaged them for the first few hours were too few in number to prove effective to maintain 'contact' with the terrorists. 

The NSG was alerted within two hours of the attacks but it took them nearly seven hours to reach the besieged city. They were summoned by Home Secretary Madhukar Gupta who called NSG chief J.K. Dutt at around 11.30 p.m. The commandos were first transported by road from their base in Manesar, Haryana, nearly 28 km from Delhi airport because they did not have dedicated airlift like helicopters with night-flying capability. At least an hour was spent at the airport loading the aircraft and waiting for home minister Shivraj Patil who then accompanied the Black Cats on their flight to Mumbai. When the NSG eventually arrived at Sahar airport at 5 a.m., they were bundled into BEST buses and taken to the Mantralaya for a briefing. It was nine in the morning by the time they reached the two hotels. The second batch of commandos arrived, but was not briefed. All attention was focused on the Taj and Oberoi hotels; nobody was aware of the hostage situation at Nariman House where Abu Akasha and Abu Umar were holding Rabbi Gavriel Holtzberg and his wife hostage, along with four others.

09.00 a.m.
No detailed layouts or maps of the buildings under attack. Relying on hotel staff and locals delayed the rescue of hostages and prolonged operations. One of the precepts of a successful building intervention operation conducted by anti-terror forces is a detailed knowledge of the layouts of the buildings to be assaulted. This is why special forces often stock building plans of all vulnerable areas and buildings, and sometimes even practice mock hostage rescue drills in them. In Mumbai, the terrorists had the advantage of a detailed hostile reconnaissance conducted, as it is now suspected, by David Headley and Tahawwur Rana.