Remembering 26/11

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Later, the 10 terrorists who had arrived at the three spots at least 12 hours before the NSG, evidently had plenty of time to study the layouts of the buildings and site their defences. These were crucial lapses which played a decisive part in prolonging the siege. At all three locations-the Oberoi, Taj and Nariman House-NSG commandos went in blind without having the building plans of the structures. Most of them were entering the hotels for the first time. They either relied on their instincts or on locals or employees to find their way around the darkened buildings. Not only did they have the challenging task of locating and rescuing guests in over 1,000 hotel rooms at the Taj and Oberoi , but they had to simultaneously fight the terrorists as well.

11.00 a.m.
No unified, consistent communication with the public

With no one-point source of information,everyone was out feeding the media, leading to further chaos

Among the basic rules of media briefing in a crisis is a unified, consistent communication from a single reliable point of contact. During the Kargil War, there were just two spokespersons, one for the Foreign Ministry and another for the armed forces. In Mumbai, not just there was no single spokesperson. The state government did not even set up a media briefing room. Evidently, mirroring the chaos after the breakdown of command and control, a sheer diversity of officials took over to brief the media. Everyone, from the NSG chief, the GOC-in-C Maharashtra and Gujarat Area, the southern army commander and the western naval command chief, were briefing the media or giving interviews during the conduct of operations. Maharashtra chief minister Vilasrao Deshmukh who returned to the city at 3 a.m. on November 27 maintained a stoic silence.

 

12.00 midnight
Intercepts of conversations not given to the NSG

Not passing on the information delayed the conclusion of operation and saving of lives

What made the 26/11 strikes chillingly different from others were the sentient voices of Pakistan-based handlers advising the terrorists on strategy, firing tactics, giving regular news updates and pep talks. Many of these mobile phone conversations were quickly intercepted by the ATS but were not passed on to the NSG commandos waiting outside the buildings. In hindsight, these conversations could have helped pinpoint the location of terrorists and save lives. In the case of Nariman House, intercepted conversations revealed that Akasha and Umar were using the hostages as bargaining chips with the Israeli Government. By the evening of November 27, the handler had instructed the terrorists to kill them. This information was not passed on to the Black Cats who are trained to storm a building when the death of the hostages is imminent. Nariman House was overrun only the next morning when the hostages were already killed.

07.30 a.m.
No efforts made to block live telecast of the operation

Live telecast of the rescue operations by the media made it easier for terrorists to plan their response

Technology was a double-edged sword during the operations. If it allowed anxious friends and relatives to keep in touch with their besieged kin through cellphones, it also enabled the terrorists to keep in touch with their handlers in Pakistan. Inadvertently helping these handlers were the news TV cameras at various spots, broadcasting live footage of the operations. One emotional MP, part of a parliamentary committee delegation of four MPs staying at the Taj, went live on TV. After watching it, an LeT handler directed the terrorists to go look for the lawmakers and take them hostage. Crucial information like the arrival of the NSG was also broadcast, allowing terrorists to plan a response.

At the Oberoi, the NSG erected a 500-m cordon around the hotel allowing the Black Cats to enter and carry out the operations in conditions of a near total blackout. At the Taj, however, the media continued to show live footage even 48 hours after the attack began. The media was directed to telecast a "deferred" live programme after instructions from the Information and Broadcasting Ministry on the afternoon of November 28.

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