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India's all too frequent disconnect between ambition and reality


Ryzen_renoir

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Courted by the U.S., Europe, Japan and even Russia, India's geopolitical importance has been rapidly elevated over recent years.

Whether as a member of the Quad, the emerging Asian bloc, or as a participant in the potential D-10 -- a grouping of the leading democracies -- the country is now viewed by many as a significant player in the world's evolving balances of power.

This newfound role within the global arena has been accelerated by the convergence of multiple interrelated factors. One is the realization of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's more muscular approach toward foreign policy and his nationalistic desire for the country to be recognized as a great or "leading" power. Another is the West's search for regional strategic partners to bolster their efforts to counter China's growing regional influence. 

images?q=tbn:ANd9GcTRzk_qXv6wNMuWmFD21rL

From an external perspective, India does appear a natural choice to underpin a regional anti-China bloc. It is, after all, now the third-largest economy in Asia and the sixth biggest globally. Its military budget is second only to China in the region and is now the third-largest in the world. Furthermore, its bilateral relationship with China has come under increasing strain in recent years and as a result, it seems more willing to develop stronger allegiances with the West.

The problem, however, is that relative size alone is not sufficient to exert geopolitical leverage, nor to secure great power status. Geopolitical influence is not achieved in isolation but is highly dependent on relative economic importance and power. And unfortunately for India, there is a significant and persistent disconnect between its increasingly grandiose foreign policy aspirations and the underlying state, capabilities and relevance of its domestic economy.

This statement may seem at odds with the widespread expectations that the country will achieve rapid growth again once it recovers from the current pandemic. But any post-COVID rebound should not be seen as indicative of its longer-term potential: many of the drivers of sustained economic development remain inherently fragile, with little evidence of material improvement over the last 10 years. It is difficult, therefore, to see India emerging any time soon as an important player in the global economy.

India's manufacturing difficulties highlight its longer-term economic challenges. It is true that the government recognizes the importance of a competitive, dynamic and innovative manufacturing base to deliver sustained economic growth and increase its relevance in international trade, especially given the precedent established by China. But despite this recognition, its current industrial capabilities are dominated by lower-order, domestically orientated and internationally uncompetitive companies, which have to be protected by some of the world's highest trade tariffs.

This explains its reluctance to enter free trade agreements, including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, as well as its near irrelevance in most global product markets. It exports fewer manufactured goods, in value terms, than Vietnam, Spain and even Belgium, and the product markets in which it is an important supplier are predominantly agricultural or commodity-related.

Furthermore, its efforts to improve its industrial capabilities have essentially failed. Despite the "Make in India" initiative, which aims to increase manufacturing's share of its gross domestic product from 15% in 2014 to 25% in 2025, the country has in fact suffered from further deindustrialization with manufacturing's GDP contribution falling to three-decade lows in both 2019 and 2020. This will complicate efforts to develop competitive industries and increase India's relevance in international trade.

These manufacturing challenges are just one example of its frequent disconnect between ambition, implementation and reality. Unlike China, India has failed to develop and execute a holistic, comprehensive and coordinated economic development plan. There are instead numerous but piecemeal policies with any advances frequently undone by embedded weaknesses elsewhere, including poor infrastructure, low educational standards and skillsets, a weak financial sector and slow technological adoption.

This is starkly highlighted by the contrast between India's economic performance over the last decade and those of its neighbors and, more importantly, China. Ten years ago, Bangladesh's GDP per capita in dollar terms was nearly half of India's. Today, it is at parity. India has also failed to narrow the economic gap with China. Its GDP was 40% of China's in 2000 but just 18% in 2020, while its share of global merchandise trade, at less than 2%, is now just a seventh of China's.

India's structural economic weaknesses remain its Achilles heel. It may want to be a regional counterweight to China and the West may want to see it achieve such status. But economic power underpins and determines geopolitical influence. Right now, India simply does not have the economic strength, neither on an absolute nor relative basis, to give credibility to its broader international aspirations. It is very much a cardboard tiger: superficially powerful but, in reality, chronically weak.

Source : Nikkei Asia

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cinemaki real life ki unnantha theda

better restrict entertainment and work on using hands and legs for work ....little brain too

hard jobs payscale is too less

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7 minutes ago, Raven_Rayes said:

India lost the one thing it had dominance over China

Generic drug manufacturing.

China has ramped up its drug production capacity to insane levels in just a few months and will, in future, drive Indian companies out of their export markets.

Even vaccine exports , bjp stonewalled all other manufacturers to benefit only two companies and thus held back all the production .

No amount of corruption did as much damage to indian economy as much as this govt's incompetence. 

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1 minute ago, Ryzen_renoir said:

Even vaccine exports , bjp stonewalled all other manufacturers to benefit only two companies and thus held back all the production .

No amount of corruption did as much damage to indian economy as much as this govt's incompetence. 

Bharat Biotech can only manufacture at max 1 cr doses/mo (after the current expansion), and someone thought its a good idea to license covaxin to just this one company. lol.

This fcukface Dr. Ella bragging about how the vaccines would be cheaper than a bottle of water (which is true, vaccines don't cost more than a few rupees to manufacture, inclusive of machinery costs), and ended up charging 1250rs/ dose.

The decision to have just one manufacturer is not a big deal, if the manufacturer is allowed to build up capacity to serve the market. 1 cr dose/mo is nothing. China is vaccinating its people at the rate of 2cr doses/day. lol.

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13 minutes ago, Mirzapur_kattappa said:

Why don't we blame this failure on Khan gress.. just wait for it... India is long ago gone case ..MODI zombie supporters now live on gomutram

 

 @rightwaris prime example ..

 

they will hide their own family deaths to keep modi pride above his 56" chest..

These people don't understand criticising modi is not equal to supporting Khan gress. 

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7 minutes ago, Ryzen_renoir said:

These people don't understand criticising modi is not equal to supporting Khan gress. 

They achieved final stage of modi bhakts bhajana 

.d12m7ybwu7371.jpg?width=640&crop=smart&a

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Just now, Mirzapur_kattappa said:

They achieved final stage of modi bhakts bhajana 

.d12m7ybwu7371.jpg?width=640&crop=smart&a

dude these pics are seriously disturbing :(

I hate these assholes as much as you do, but its hard to eat after seeing these :giggle:

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51 minutes ago, Ryzen_renoir said:

Courted by the U.S., Europe, Japan and even Russia, India's geopolitical importance has been rapidly elevated over recent years.

Whether as a member of the Quad, the emerging Asian bloc, or as a participant in the potential D-10 -- a grouping of the leading democracies -- the country is now viewed by many as a significant player in the world's evolving balances of power.

This newfound role within the global arena has been accelerated by the convergence of multiple interrelated factors. One is the realization of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's more muscular approach toward foreign policy and his nationalistic desire for the country to be recognized as a great or "leading" power. Another is the West's search for regional strategic partners to bolster their efforts to counter China's growing regional influence. 

images?q=tbn:ANd9GcTRzk_qXv6wNMuWmFD21rL

From an external perspective, India does appear a natural choice to underpin a regional anti-China bloc. It is, after all, now the third-largest economy in Asia and the sixth biggest globally. Its military budget is second only to China in the region and is now the third-largest in the world. Furthermore, its bilateral relationship with China has come under increasing strain in recent years and as a result, it seems more willing to develop stronger allegiances with the West.

The problem, however, is that relative size alone is not sufficient to exert geopolitical leverage, nor to secure great power status. Geopolitical influence is not achieved in isolation but is highly dependent on relative economic importance and power. And unfortunately for India, there is a significant and persistent disconnect between its increasingly grandiose foreign policy aspirations and the underlying state, capabilities and relevance of its domestic economy.

This statement may seem at odds with the widespread expectations that the country will achieve rapid growth again once it recovers from the current pandemic. But any post-COVID rebound should not be seen as indicative of its longer-term potential: many of the drivers of sustained economic development remain inherently fragile, with little evidence of material improvement over the last 10 years. It is difficult, therefore, to see India emerging any time soon as an important player in the global economy.

India's manufacturing difficulties highlight its longer-term economic challenges. It is true that the government recognizes the importance of a competitive, dynamic and innovative manufacturing base to deliver sustained economic growth and increase its relevance in international trade, especially given the precedent established by China. But despite this recognition, its current industrial capabilities are dominated by lower-order, domestically orientated and internationally uncompetitive companies, which have to be protected by some of the world's highest trade tariffs.

This explains its reluctance to enter free trade agreements, including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, as well as its near irrelevance in most global product markets. It exports fewer manufactured goods, in value terms, than Vietnam, Spain and even Belgium, and the product markets in which it is an important supplier are predominantly agricultural or commodity-related.

Furthermore, its efforts to improve its industrial capabilities have essentially failed. Despite the "Make in India" initiative, which aims to increase manufacturing's share of its gross domestic product from 15% in 2014 to 25% in 2025, the country has in fact suffered from further deindustrialization with manufacturing's GDP contribution falling to three-decade lows in both 2019 and 2020. This will complicate efforts to develop competitive industries and increase India's relevance in international trade.

These manufacturing challenges are just one example of its frequent disconnect between ambition, implementation and reality. Unlike China, India has failed to develop and execute a holistic, comprehensive and coordinated economic development plan. There are instead numerous but piecemeal policies with any advances frequently undone by embedded weaknesses elsewhere, including poor infrastructure, low educational standards and skillsets, a weak financial sector and slow technological adoption.

This is starkly highlighted by the contrast between India's economic performance over the last decade and those of its neighbors and, more importantly, China. Ten years ago, Bangladesh's GDP per capita in dollar terms was nearly half of India's. Today, it is at parity. India has also failed to narrow the economic gap with China. Its GDP was 40% of China's in 2000 but just 18% in 2020, while its share of global merchandise trade, at less than 2%, is now just a seventh of China's.

India's structural economic weaknesses remain its Achilles heel. It may want to be a regional counterweight to China and the West may want to see it achieve such status. But economic power underpins and determines geopolitical influence. Right now, India simply does not have the economic strength, neither on an absolute nor relative basis, to give credibility to its broader international aspirations. It is very much a cardboard tiger: superficially powerful but, in reality, chronically weak.

Source : Nikkei Asia

India, particularly north India is a failed nation ... just surviving on south india economy 

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52 minutes ago, Ryzen_renoir said:

Courted by the U.S., Europe, Japan and even Russia, India's geopolitical importance has been rapidly elevated over recent years.

Whether as a member of the Quad, the emerging Asian bloc, or as a participant in the potential D-10 -- a grouping of the leading democracies -- the country is now viewed by many as a significant player in the world's evolving balances of power.

This newfound role within the global arena has been accelerated by the convergence of multiple interrelated factors. One is the realization of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's more muscular approach toward foreign policy and his nationalistic desire for the country to be recognized as a great or "leading" power. Another is the West's search for regional strategic partners to bolster their efforts to counter China's growing regional influence. 

images?q=tbn:ANd9GcTRzk_qXv6wNMuWmFD21rL

From an external perspective, India does appear a natural choice to underpin a regional anti-China bloc. It is, after all, now the third-largest economy in Asia and the sixth biggest globally. Its military budget is second only to China in the region and is now the third-largest in the world. Furthermore, its bilateral relationship with China has come under increasing strain in recent years and as a result, it seems more willing to develop stronger allegiances with the West.

The problem, however, is that relative size alone is not sufficient to exert geopolitical leverage, nor to secure great power status. Geopolitical influence is not achieved in isolation but is highly dependent on relative economic importance and power. And unfortunately for India, there is a significant and persistent disconnect between its increasingly grandiose foreign policy aspirations and the underlying state, capabilities and relevance of its domestic economy.

This statement may seem at odds with the widespread expectations that the country will achieve rapid growth again once it recovers from the current pandemic. But any post-COVID rebound should not be seen as indicative of its longer-term potential: many of the drivers of sustained economic development remain inherently fragile, with little evidence of material improvement over the last 10 years. It is difficult, therefore, to see India emerging any time soon as an important player in the global economy.

India's manufacturing difficulties highlight its longer-term economic challenges. It is true that the government recognizes the importance of a competitive, dynamic and innovative manufacturing base to deliver sustained economic growth and increase its relevance in international trade, especially given the precedent established by China. But despite this recognition, its current industrial capabilities are dominated by lower-order, domestically orientated and internationally uncompetitive companies, which have to be protected by some of the world's highest trade tariffs.

This explains its reluctance to enter free trade agreements, including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, as well as its near irrelevance in most global product markets. It exports fewer manufactured goods, in value terms, than Vietnam, Spain and even Belgium, and the product markets in which it is an important supplier are predominantly agricultural or commodity-related.

Furthermore, its efforts to improve its industrial capabilities have essentially failed. Despite the "Make in India" initiative, which aims to increase manufacturing's share of its gross domestic product from 15% in 2014 to 25% in 2025, the country has in fact suffered from further deindustrialization with manufacturing's GDP contribution falling to three-decade lows in both 2019 and 2020. This will complicate efforts to develop competitive industries and increase India's relevance in international trade.

These manufacturing challenges are just one example of its frequent disconnect between ambition, implementation and reality. Unlike China, India has failed to develop and execute a holistic, comprehensive and coordinated economic development plan. There are instead numerous but piecemeal policies with any advances frequently undone by embedded weaknesses elsewhere, including poor infrastructure, low educational standards and skillsets, a weak financial sector and slow technological adoption.

This is starkly highlighted by the contrast between India's economic performance over the last decade and those of its neighbors and, more importantly, China. Ten years ago, Bangladesh's GDP per capita in dollar terms was nearly half of India's. Today, it is at parity. India has also failed to narrow the economic gap with China. Its GDP was 40% of China's in 2000 but just 18% in 2020, while its share of global merchandise trade, at less than 2%, is now just a seventh of China's.

India's structural economic weaknesses remain its Achilles heel. It may want to be a regional counterweight to China and the West may want to see it achieve such status. But economic power underpins and determines geopolitical influence. Right now, India simply does not have the economic strength, neither on an absolute nor relative basis, to give credibility to its broader international aspirations. It is very much a cardboard tiger: superficially powerful but, in reality, chronically weak.

Source : Nikkei Asia

What s your *** point buddy in posting all these third party articles in this db? janaalu google cheyylera or as thuraka isi naa koduku narsy gaaditho Kalisi country troubles celebrate chesukuntunnava

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1 minute ago, Kreole_ said:

What s your  ??fuckin**??  point buddy in posting all these third party articles in this db? janaalu google cheyylera or aa thuraka isi naa koduku narsy gaaditho Kalisi country troubles celebrate chesukuntunnava

 

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8 minutes ago, Kreole_ said:

What s your *** point buddy in posting all these third party articles in this db? janaalu google cheyylera or as thuraka isi naa koduku narsy gaaditho Kalisi country troubles celebrate chesukuntunnava

Correct..

 

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